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Chapter pages in book: (p. 57 - 61)affected by the latter program.31 The prices of farm products and
of related foods and textiles recorded the largest gains of the year,
under the combined influence of the increase in aggregate demand
and of the special conditions created by war, including the gov-
ernment's farm-price policy.
In 1940—1941, then, the rise in spending for defense purposes
promoted an expansion in total spending which was largely uncon-
trolled until late in 1941. Prices did not begin to rise sharply until
the simultaneous expansion of government and private spending
had taken up the slack in unutilized capacity that existed at the
beginning of the expansion, but inflationary pressures were un-
abated thereafter. In these respects the expansion progressed as
theory and the observation of peacetime expansions would suggest.
The surprising developments of the Korean period appear all the
more unusual when viewed against this background.
Postscript:War and Peace Cycles
Broadlyconceived, war is simply one of a number of external
forces that may impinge on an economy and thereby modify the
direction and pace of economic activity. The peculiar feature that
distinguishes war from other external forces is the magnitude of
the claim exerted by the state on the nation's resources. Once
committed to mobilization, whether for defense or active warfare,
the ordinary restraints on government spending must be brushed
aside. An important new demand force is created, a force not con-
strained by income limitations or the need to estimate the poten-
tial profitability of economic decisions. This is the basic fact that
gives war cycles their family resemblance and sets them apart from
peace cycles. However, war cycles bear only a family resemblance
—significant differences are observable in the economic develop-
ments associated with World War I, World War H, and the Korean
War. The implications of those differences must be taken into
account in any comparison of war and peace cycles.
31Amongthe commodities affected were hogs, evaporated milk, cheese, chickens and
eggs, a number of vegetables, wheat, corn, cotton, tobacco, and rice.Cf. Survey of
Current Business, February 1942, pp. 29—30.
57This is not the place to attempt a detailed comparison of war
and peace cycles,32 but two important topics are directly relevant
to the subject of this paper and deserve further comment. They
are (1) the magnitude of the mobilization effort and (2) the influ-
ence of war on consumer spending.
The basic characteristic of war mobilization may be simply
stated: Resources must be diverted from the private to the govern-
ment sector, from peacetime to wartime uses. The greater the
scale of the diversion required, the more severe are the economic
problems created. It may be possible for .the economy to support
a moderate mobilization without serious inflationary consequences,
whereas a full-scale mobilization almost inevitably enlarges the
aggregate demand for goods and services to such an extent that
direct administrative controls or other devices are adopted to sup-
plement or supplant the price mechanism as the basic device for
resource allocation and income distribution. It is an obvious cor-
ollary that the magnitude of the mobilization effort will influence
the character of the economic developments during the mobiliza-
tion period. Furthermore, postwar (or post-mobilization) develop-
ments are likely to be very different if a mobilization assumes pro-
portions requiring huge government deficits and direct controls
than if it does not. These points may be illustrated by a brief
comparison of World War II and the Korean War.
During the long period of United States participation in World
War II, the physical supply of consumer durable goods was severely
contracted, and the supply of nondurable goods increased only
moderately. Disposable income increased much more rapidly than
the supply of consumer goods, but price controls and rationing
prevented consumers from bidding freely for scarce goods, and a
positive incentive to save was provided by the war-bond campaign,
among other things. As a result, the percentage of income saved
in the years 1942—1944 was four to five times as large as the rates
typical of peacetime high employment years (Table 3), and huge
volumes of liquid savings were accumulated. Consumers emerged
32 For an instructive comparison of economic changes in the two world wars and in
peacetime business expansions see Wesley C. Mitchell, Wartime 'Prosperity' and the
Future, National Bureau of Economic Research, Occasional Paper 9, 1943.
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0from the war anxious to buy the goods denied them during the
war effort and supplied with accumulated savin.gs to help make
their desires effective in the market place. They lost no time.
Consumer expenditures began climbing in the last half of 1945
in the face of falling disposable income.33 The saving ratio de-
creased nearly 25 per cent between 1944 and 1945, and was halved
between 1945 and 1946.
Private capital formation was also severely repressed during the
war years.Inventories were depleted, replacement and mainte-
nance of capital facilities were postponed, the construction of new
facilities for the production of civilian goods was curtailed, and
peacetime industrial facilities were converted to the production
of munitions on an extensive scale. These wartime developments
created a strong potential postwar investment demand, which was
reinforced by the high liquidity of the business community and
the easy-money policy of the monetary authorities. To make this
potential demand fully effective, it was necessary to weather the
transition to a peacetime economy, in order that a cumulative de-
cline in income and expenditures should not develop from the
reduction in government spending before consumers and investors
could make their pent-up demands effective on the market. It is
a matter of history that the transition was successfully completed,
and that by mid-1946 the nation was faced with the problem of
excess demand and inflation rather than deficient demand and
unemployment. It is quite clear that the backlogs of demand cre-
ated during the war were factors of great importance in the rapid
postwar recovery of private expenditures.
Although the differential trends in the production of civilian
and military goods typical of war economy appeared once again
during the Korean mobilization, they were by no means compa-
rable to the shifts in the composition of gross national product that
occurred in World War II, and they cannot be traced to the same
set of causes. In a very real sense the relative decline of consump-
33 Disposable income fell from $153 billion in the second quarter of 1945 to $148
billion in the fourth quarter (seasonally adjusted quarterly totals at annual rates).
Nonetheless, in every quarter but one, disposable income was higher than in 1944,
so that it rose $4 billion between 1944 and 1945 on an annual basis (Table 3).
59tion and investment related to consumption during 1951—1952
was voluntary. Furthermore, the balanced expansion of 1952 con-
tinued into 1953 with increased consumer expenditures account-
ing for more than two-thirds of the increase in real gross national
product (Table 7).Finally, the "high" rate of personal saving in
7
GRoss NATIONAL PRODUCT, IN CONSTANT DOLLARS, 1949—1953
(billionsof 1939 dollars)
1949 19501951 19521953
Gross national product 144.0156.2167.0172.0178.6
Personal consumption expenditures 103.2108.9108.5111.4115.9
Durable goods 12.9 15.5 13.4 12.9 14.4
Nondurable goods 50.7 51.7 52.4 54.5 55.8
Services 39.6 41.7 42.6 44.0 45.6
Gross private domestic investment 18.0 26.8 27.6 24.3 24.9
New construction 7.9 9.7 9.2 9.0 9.4
Producers' durable equipment 11.4 13.3 13.4 13.6 14.2
Change in business inventories —1.3 3.8 5.0 1.7 1.3
Netforeign investment 0.6—0.1 2.0 1.4 0.4
Government purchases of goods and
services 22.2 20.7 28.9 34.8 37.4
Federal 12.9 10.8 18.9 24.5 26.6
State and local 9.3 9.8 9.9 10.3 10.8
Source: Survey of Current Business, February 1954, Table 1.
the past few years does not begin to compare with the rates attained
during World War II (Table 3).
It is apparent that no "wartime" base was laid during the Korean
mobilization to ease the problem of adjustment to the decline of
defense expenditures now facing the economy. The mobiliza-
tion did not create the kind of conditions that were responsible
for the abnormal booms of consumption and investment demand
that followed World War II.It should be added that the prob-
lem itself is not as severe as that posed by the ending of World
War II. The same basic fact that minimized the accumulation of
backlogs of demand—the smaller scale of the military program—
60will also minimize the problem of adjustment itself, in the sense
• that only a relatively small increase in private expenditures would
be needed to compensate for the maximum probable decline in
defense expenditures and to absorb additional productive capacity
resulting from growth in the labor force and in productivity. The
moot question is whether even such a relatively modest increase
in private expenditures can be attained after eight years of high-
level activity.
Since the end of World War II we have witnessed two dramatic
instances of independent variations in consumer spending—that is,
changes in consumer expenditures that were not induced by con-
current changes in real income. The first was the upsurge of con-
sumer demand that followed World War II, to which we have just
referred, and the second was the series of rapid shifts in consumer
spending during the early months of the Korean expansion. It is
clear that in both periods the course of economic activity was
strongly influenced by pronounced shifts of the consumption func-
tion.
The hypothesis that consumer expenditures are primarily a
function of real income has been widely accepted by economists.
Partly as a result, the origin of business cycles has been sought in
factors that might be expected to cause fluctuations in investment.
The instability of consumer spending in recent years suggests that
this may be an oversimplification. However, it is important to
observe that this recent instability has been the result of disturb-
ances created by war and in no way demonstrates that peacetime
cycles are regularly affected by independent fluctuations in con-
sumer spending. Whether that is the case remains an open ques-
tion, which can be answered only by further empirical investiga-
tion.
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